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MP168 'CPL Security Improvements'

Modification Report

Version 0.3

11 May 2022



About this document

This document is a draft Modification Report. It currently sets out the background, issue, and progression timetable for this modification, along with any relevant discussions, views and conclusions. This document will be updated as this modification progresses.

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This document also has one annex:

- **Annex A** contains the business requirements for the solution.

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1. Summary

This proposal has been raised by Gordon Hextall on behalf of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC).

Smart Energy Code (SEC) Appendix Z 'CPL Requirements Document' requires the Panel to check that a communication requesting a firmware Image to be associated with a Device Model on the Central Products List (CPL) originates from the person who created the Image and is endorsed by a Supplier. At present, the nature of the signatures used by manufacturers does not enable cryptographic authentication that the communication originates from a specific manufacturer beyond reasonable doubt. Neither a Supplier nor the SEC Panel can therefore suitably verify the authenticity of the communication and therefore fully meet the SEC obligation.

The SSC considers that there are readily available commercially effective solutions that can be adopted by the Data Communications Company (DCC) as an extension to the Infrastructure Key Infrastructure (IKI) service. Therefore, the SSC, with support from the Smart Metering Key Infrastructure (SMKI) Policy Management Authority (PMA), wishes to address the current SEC compliance issue and improve the security controls.

2. Issue

What are the current arrangements?

What is the Central Products List?

The DCC uses the CPL to manage the Devices it can communicate with. If a Device is not listed on the CPL, a User cannot communicate with it other than to update the firmware to a version that is on the CPL. Only once a Device has met the requirements set out in the CPL Requirements Document can it be added to the CPL. The CPL is a list of Device Models that are either:

- Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (SMETS) 2 Devices which have received all relevant Assurance Certificates; or
- SMETS1 Devices which have been notified by the DCC and have been included as entries on the SMETS1 Eligible Products Combination list.

SEC Section F 'Smart Metering System Requirements' (section 2) defines the CPL and is supplemented by SEC Appendix Z.

Validating CPL entries

SEC Appendix Z sections 4.1 and 4.3 require the Panel to check that a communication requesting a firmware Image to be associated with a Device Model on the CPL originates from the person who created the Image and is endorsed by a Supplier. In practice this is carried out by the Smart Energy Code Administrator and Secretariat (SECAS) on behalf of the Panel.

Relevant extract from Appendix Z

The following is an extract from version 2.0 of SEC Appendix Z setting out the obligations for associating a Hash (in relation to a firmware Image) with a Device Model on the CPL:

4. Association of Hashes with Device Models on the CPL

- 4.1 *Where the DCC or a Supplier Party wishes the Panel to associate the Hash of a Manufacturer Image with a Device Model on the Central Products List, that Party shall provide the Hash and the identity of the person who created the Manufacturer Image in a communication to the Panel which has been Digitally Signed by the person who created the Manufacturer Image in a manner that reasonably enables the Panel to check that the communication originates from the person who created the Manufacturer Image.*
- 4.2 *The Panel may specify the format which the communication referred to in Clause 4.1 must take (in which case Parties sending such communications must use such format). The Panel shall notify the relevant Parties of any such required format and of any changes to such required format that the Panel may make from time to time.*
- 4.3 *The Panel shall only associate a Hash provided under Clause 4.1 with a Device Model on the Central Products List where:*
 - (a) *the Panel has successfully confirmed that the Digital Signature referred to in Clause 4.1 is that of the person who created the Manufacturer Image (validated as necessary by reference to a trusted party);*
 - (b) *there is no Hash currently associated with the Device Model; provided that, if there is a Hash currently associated with the Device Model, the Panel shall investigate the matter with the relevant Parties to identify whether it is appropriate to replace the associated Hash (and shall, where it is appropriate to do so, update the Central Products List accordingly); and*
 - (c) *if the Device Model is a SMETS1 Device Model, the communication to the Panel referred to in Clause 4.1 is from the DCC.*

What is the issue?

At present, the nature of the signatures used by manufacturers does not enable cryptographic authentication that the communication originates from a specific manufacturer beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, neither a Supplier nor the Panel can suitably verify the authenticity of the communication and is unable to fully meet the SEC obligation.

SEC Appendix Z section 4.2 allows the Panel to specify the format which the communication referred to in section 4.1 must take. The SSC has considered the security implications and considers that there are commercial solutions that are readily available that can be adopted by the DCC as an extension to the IKI service. Therefore, the SSC, with support from the SMKI PMA, wishes to address the current SEC compliance issue and improve the security controls.

What is the impact this is having?

If this issue is not resolved, the Panel will not be able to fully authenticate communications requesting a firmware Image to be associated with a Device Model on the CPL originates from the person who created the Image and is endorsed by a Supplier.

Impact on consumers

Although there are controls in place to prevent this, if this issue is not resolved, it may increase an easily avoidable risk of consumer smart metering Devices receiving improperly authorised or, in the worst case, malicious firmware.

3. Assessment of the proposal

Areas for assessment

Sub-Committee input

SECAS has engaged with the Chairs from the Operations Group (OPSG), the Technical Architecture and Business Architecture Sub-Committee (TABASC), the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) and the Smart Metering Key Infrastructure Policy Management Authority (SMKI PMA) to confirm what input is required from these forums. SECAS believes the following Sub-Committees will need to provide the following input to this modification:

Sub-Committee input	
Sub-Committee	Input sought
OPSG	None
SMKI PMA	Input on Proposed Solution and legal text
SSC	Input on Proposed Solution and legal text
TABASC	None

Observations on the issue

Change Sub-Committee views

A member questioned whether the DCC will be impacted by this modification. SECAS explained that the Proposer is keen to see this progressed as soon as possible, but that the Proposed Solution may impact DCC processes, hence why a Preliminary Assessment may be required. SECAS advised a possible solution has been discussed that would see the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) being published on the DCC's website. However, there is a SEC obligation which denies the DCC permission to publish the CRL online and so this obligation would need to be changed.

Other issues benefited by this proposal

The initial drafts of the business requirements specifically referred to the use case of validating CPL submissions. However, the Proposer noted that publication of the CRL on the DCC website would benefit other use cases as well, such as the need for a Device manufacturer to authenticate the link being used for Device triage.

Requirements workshop comments

An attendee questioned the intent of the proposal and if any manufacturer impacts were foreseen for the way in which they make CPL submissions. The Proposer and other attendees clarified that the proposal is looking to improve the authentication of a communication made by a Supplier requesting to add a Manufacturer Image to the CPL. However, it does not seek to make any changes to the way in which a manufacturer signs the Manufacturer Image.

Solution development

This solution aims to improve the authentication of communications submitting new entries to the CPL that include a Manufacturer Image Hash and/or if a Commercial Product Assurance (CPA) Certificate has been previously used. This will ultimately improve the CPL security controls.

The solution does not intend to alter current elements of the process that Device Manufacturers must follow when signing their Manufacturer Images, other than that they will be required to do this via IKI Certificates, rather than using another reputable Certificate Authority. Suppliers or the DCC will be required to countersign CPL submissions with an IKI Certificate using the X.509 format. These IKI Certificates must be compatible with standard software packages such as Microsoft.

Certificate Revocation List

The CRL holds the list of certificates that are no longer valid, either through the expiration or because an individual has left the organisation to which it is assigned. The CRL will need to be published in the public domain and accessible by a standard web browser to allow Suppliers and SECAS to validate the certificates on the submissions.

Guidance Notes

A Device Manufacturer commented that the existing Guidance Notes for updating the CPL submissions will need to be updated to include clear instructions to enable Suppliers to easily countersign. They noted that the existing notes refer to the Microsoft website and the guidance on here is not clear enough.

SECAS will ensure that this is delivered as part of the modification.

Device Manufacturers that are not SEC Parties

It is noted that Device Manufacturers are not required to become SEC Parties. The DCC will need to develop a process that allows non-SEC Parties to apply for Certificates.

Appendix 1: Progression timetable

A DCC Preliminary Assessment has been requested.

Timetable	
Event/Action	Date
Draft Proposal raised	11 Jun 2021
Presented to CSC for initial comment	29 Jun 2021
Business requirements developed with Proposer	Aug 2021 – Sep 2021
Business requirements workshop	20 Sep 2021
CSC converts Draft Proposal to Modification Proposal	28 Sep 2021
Business requirements developed with Proposer and DCC	4 May 2022
Modification discussed with Working Group	4 May 2022
Preliminary Assessment requested	11 May 2022
Modification discussed with Working Group	6 Jul 2022
Refinement Consultation	11 – 29 Jul 2022
Update provided to CSC	19 Jul 2022

Appendix 2: Glossary

This table lists all the acronyms used in this document and the full term they are an abbreviation for.

Glossary	
Acronym	Full term
CPA	Commercial Product Assurance
CPL	Central Products List
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSC	Change Sub-Committee
DCC	Data Communications Company
IKI	Infrastructure Key Infrastructure
OPSG	Operations Group
SEC	Smart Energy Code
SECAS	Smart Energy Code Administrator and Secretariat
SMETS	Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications
SMKI PMA	Smart Metering Key Infrastructure Policy Management Authority
SSC	Security Sub-Committee
TABASC	Technical Architecture and Business Architecture Sub-Committee